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Why We Need to Do Fewer
Statistical Tests
A recent collaboration, in which a large number of psychological studies were carefully
repeated, found that a majority of the findings could not be replicated (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). Is there any reason to believe that articles in Perception are more
reliable? If not, is there anything we can do to increase the reliability? In order to answer
this question, we need to consider why so many findings could not be replicated. Presumably,
this is because the findings were not really true effects in the first place, despite being
significant. They were false positives. But why are there so many false positives? Cases of
scientists fabricating data to prove their point are disturbing, but not common, so there must
be some other reason. Questionable practices such as testing more subjects when an effect is
close to significance can certainly make reported statistics less reliable (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011), but this is unlikely to be responsible for the fact that over half the effects
are not reproducible.
Could the abundance of false positives have anything to do with the fact that significant
effects are overrepresented in the scientific literature (Ioannidis,Munafò, Fusar-Poli, Nosek, &
David, 2014)? The overrepresentation of significant effects is presumably mainly the result of
various biases in reporting (Ioannidis et al., 2014). Authors may not bother trying to publish
data if the effect that they were looking for was not significant. Moreover, reviewers are often
more critical when evaluating papers in which the null hypothesis was not rejected. This is not
completely unjustified, because claiming that there is an effect when it is significant is rather
straightforward, whereas claiming that there is no effect when it is not significant requires an
estimate of the expected effect size and of the variability in the measure of interest, in order to
guarantee that the effect would have been significant if it were present. Moreover, there has to
be some justification for expecting an effect in the first place. It is perhaps not directly obvious
why not publishing some papers would make the others less reproducible, but I will
explain why I believe that the underlying emphasis on significant effects does have severe
consequences when combined with the tendency to use statistics to explore one’s own data.
Our standard statistical tests were developed to test hypotheses. As a community, we
accept a 5% chance of false positives. The reason for being so lenient is that being very
strict would make us often conclude incorrectly that there is no effect when actually there is
an effect. Hopefully, 5% is a reasonable value in terms of matching the likelihoods of
incorrectly concluding that there is an effect when there is none (a Type 1 error), and of
incorrectly concluding that there is no effect when actually there is an effect (a Type 2 error).
Accepting a 5% chance of making a Type 1 error might make us expect that only 5% of
attempts to replicate significant effects will fail. However, it is not that simple. One way to see
this is by considering a field of research in which people only test things that we know to have
no effect. If there is no true effect and the measures all have normally distributed variability,
then about 5% of the tests will be significant. If we select the effects that appear to be
significant and try to replicate them, obviously only about 5% of them will replicate.
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Thus, if we select the significant effects from many tests of things that certainly have no true
effect, we will fail to replicate about 95% of them. The Open Science Collaboration only tried
to replicate significant or almost-significant effects.
It is safe to assume that in our field people do not only test things that have no true effect,
and true effects obviously have a much higher likelihood of being replicable. However, it is
just as safe to assume that we cannot only test effects that are true effects, because if we know
which effects are true effects we do not need to do the research. Testing things that have no
true effect inevitably gives rise to false positives, and the higher the proportion of false
positives, the lower the probability of a randomly chosen significant effect being replicable.
Thus, the more we test for effects that are not true effects, the less reproducible ‘‘significant
effects’’ will be (for a more thorough explanation see Ioannidis, 2005).
What can be done about this? It is certainly not a good idea to discourage people from
testing well-motivated hypotheses. However, asking for fewer rather than more statistical
tests might help. Imagine that we are interested in whether metal objects look heavier than
wooden ones. We decide to test this by presenting subjects with a 1-cm diameter metal sphere
next to a wooden sphere of one of several diameters and asking them to indicate which looks
heavier (a standard two alternative forced choice task). Just in case objects on the right look
heavier than ones on the left, we randomly pick the side on which the metal sphere is
presented. We then use standard techniques to determine the size of the wooden sphere
that matches the metal sphere in apparent weight (for instance, by fitting a psychometric
curve to the fractions of times the wooden sphere was judged to be heavier for various sizes of
the wooden sphere and determining the size for which the fraction would be exactly half). If
we determine this for several people, we could use a t-test to see whether the material has a
systematic influence on the judged weight (in which case the size will differ systematically
from that of the metal sphere). Presumably it does. So presumably, we would have a
significant effect, and it would be no problem to replicate this effect. Since the metal
sphere is sometimes on the left and sometimes on the right, we might be lured into testing
whether the influence of the material depends on the side on which the metal sphere was
presented. We might also notice during the experiment that several participants who wear
spectacles have particularly large effects and therefore decide to check whether the effect
depends on whether the participant wears spectacles. Moreover, we may have reported
that we had both male and female participants, and a reviewer may have asked us to test
whether there were any gender differences. By testing whether these factors and their
interactions influence the effect of material on the judged weight, we will have added a
large number of tests of effects that presumably are not present. A full three-way ANOVA
(with factors side, spectacles and gender) will test seven additional options (three main effects,
three two-way interactions, and a three-way interaction).
Adding this kind of ANOVA is often considered to be a good thing because you are getting
more out of your data. The problem with carrying out such ANOVAs is that it reduces the
overall reliability of significant results. If we want to increase the reproducibility of reported
effects, the simplest thing to do is to stop testing for effects that are not part of the hypothesis
under study. This does not mean that one should not look critically at the data to see whether
there are any relationships that might have influenced the findings. However, if one finds
something that looks interesting, one should not use statistics that were devised to test
hypotheses to decide whether the effect should be taken seriously. For every question that is
being asked, there will usually be a critical statistical measure that needs to be reported. In
many studies, various possible confounding factors need to be considered. Providing data
about them is fine, but there is no need to run statistical tests on all of them. If it seems
from the data that people wearing spectacles judge metal objects to be heavier in relation to
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wooden ones than do people who do not wear spectacles, one might want to look into this, but
conducting the additional ANOVA mentioned above is not the way to test this unless you
started off with the hypothesis that spectacles would have this effect.
The fact that so many reported effects cannot be replicated means that it is worthwhile
trying to replicate important findings before relying on them. Consequently, if you fail to
replicate an important effect you should not be expected to explain why you got a different
result, as is now often the case, but it should be acceptable to propose that the effect might have
been a statistical coincidence. Publishing such failures to replicate will help prevent false
positives from guiding our theories and further research. If a replication does give the same
result, it should also get published, because replications indicate that the particular finding
should guide our theories and further research. However, rather than trying to publish many
replications, it might be better to strive for fewer false positives to start with. The easiest way to
reduce the number of false positives is by discouraging exploratory statistical testing. If an
experiment is testing a hypothesis, there should seldom be a need for more than one
comparison from one statistical test in order to determine whether to reject the hypothesis.
Drawing any conclusions from additional comparisons or tests should therefore be considered
suspicious. I would therefore like to encourage authors to use fewer statistical tests, and
reviewers and editors to ask for fewer, rather than more, statistical tests. It is important to
stop building theories on spurious significant findings, so we, as scientists, can spend our time
figuring out how to interpret the findings rather than arguing about the data.
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